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At least since classical political economy, studies of the medium- and long-term dynamics of 
economic systems have highlighted the relationship between changes in the magnitude of economic 
variables and changes in their composition. Adam Smith associates the changes in the magnitudes of 
the social product with changes in the relative proportions of productive sectors such as the proportion 
between agriculture and manufacturing (Smith, 1976 [1776], Book III ‘Of the Different Progress of 
Opulence in Different Nations’). David Ricardo associates an increasing social product with changing 
proportions between labour and produced means of production under conditions of limited 
availability of agricultural land (Ricardo, 1951 [1817], Chapter II ‘On Rent’). By associating 
economic dynamics with structural change, that is, with changes in the relative proportions between 
sectors of the economy, these classical contributions explored, with reference to an expanding 
economy, a general principle already identified by Pierre de Boisguillebert, according to which ‘it is 
thus proportions that make the whole wealth’ (Boisguillebert, 1843 [1707], p. 279)4. This point of 
view is again apparent in the structural theories of economic fluctuations of the late 19th and early 
20th century (Tugan Baranovsky, 1913 [1894]; Aftalion, 1913; Robertson, 1915; Bouniatian, 1922 
[1907]), in the mid- and late-20th century theories of sequential change on transitional paths (Hicks, 
1965, 1973, 1985; Dahmén, 1970 [1950]) and in 20th century theories of structural economic 
dynamics (Pasinetti, 1965, 1981, 1993; Leon, 1967; Lowe, 1976; Quadrio Curzio, 1986; Quadrio 
Curzio and Pellizzari, 1999).  
More specifically, a common feature of the aforementioned theories is that relative 
proportions must remain within a range of feasible transformations. This highlights an important 
feature of structural change: not all system components can change at the same time and/or at the 
same speed. In other words, a principle of relative structural invariance is in play behind the 
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transformations of most economic structures (Landesmann and Scazzieri, 1990, 1996; Scazzieri, 
2018a, 2018b). By relying on this principle, theories of structural change can explain the way in which 
economic dynamics entails changes across system components (for instance, different speeds of 
change across different industries). Therefore, they can explain the range of changes that is made 
possible by given economic structures. However, in order to move from identifying a range of 
possibilities to specifying a path of change out of those which are possible, these theories make 
explicit or implicit assumptions about actions taking place within structures. This, we argue, suggests 
that structural change is to some degree open-ended: existing structures specify ranges of possibilities, 
not the specific actions taken therein. Therefore, they specify potential rather than actual dynamics. 
It is in historical contexts that the actual path of structural change is determined, once actors have 
performed specific actions instead of others. But this is determined ex post, not ex ante. Far from 
being a limitation, this is a defining feature that makes it possible to avoid conceiving of structural 
change as deterministic. Accordingly, we suggest conceiving of theories of structural change as 
identifying the range of possible changes that might take place depending on the actions carried out 
within those structures in specific historical contexts. On this view, in order to explain structural 
change, we need to consider the possibilities opened up by economic structures as well as the actions 
that take place within those possibilities.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the classical and post-classical theories 
of structural change, highlighting relative structural invariance as the common ground of theories 
addressing medium- and long-term structural change. The analysis identifies relative structural 
invariance as the principle whereby structures determine the range of possible transformations, and 
examines what individual and/or collective actions are implied in moving from possible 
transformations to specific paths of structural change. Section 3 addresses the relationship between 
structural changes in the medium- and long-term and discusses it in terms of plural causality and 
successive levels of approximation. Section 4 concludes the paper by examining the interplay 
between actions and structures and argues that this interplay brings to light the central causal 
framework explaining structural change in given contexts.  
 
2. Structural Change and Structural Invariance 
2.1. Classical political economy  
Smith’s Wealth of Nations provides an early instance of dynamic analysis focussing on the 
relationship between system components and the corresponding proportionality conditions. This 
approach characterizes both his analysis of the long-term dynamics of economic systems and his 
investigation of the medium-term adjustment of productive units to external shocks. The study of 
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long-term dynamics brings Smith to examine the ‘natural progress of opulence’ of national economies 
as they move across different stages of development (Smith, 1976 [1776], Book III ‘Of the Different 
Progress of Opulence in Different Nations’). Here Smith identifies structural conditions suggesting a 
dynamic trajectory characterized by the development first of agriculture, then of manufacturing, and 
finally of ‘carrying trade’ (provision of trade services to others): 
As subsistence is, in the nature of things, prior to conveniency and luxury, so the industry 
which procures the former, must necessarily be prior to that which ministers the latter. The cultivation 
and improvement of the country, therefore, which affords subsistence, must, necessarily, be prior to 
the increase of the town, which furnishes only the means of conveniency and luxury. It is the surplus 
produce of the country only, or what is over and above the maintenance of the cultivators, that 
constitutes the subsistence of the town, which can therefore increase only with the increase of this 
surplus produce. (Smith, 1976 [1776], III.1.2, p. 377) 
According to the natural course of things, therefore, the greater part of their capital of every 
growing society is, first, directed to agriculture, afterwards to manufactures, and last of all to foreign 
commerce. This order of things is so very natural, that in every society that had any territory, it has 
always, I believe, been in some degree observed. Some of their lands must have been cultivated before 
any considerable towns could be established, and some sort of coarse industry of the manufacturing 
kind must have been carried on in those towns, before they could well think of employing themselves 
in foreign commerce. (Smith, 1976 [1776], III.1.8, p. 380). 
 
The above sequence of production regimes reflects the structural conditions governing the 
formation of the social product. In a first stage of development, the provision of subsistence goods is 
of primary importance, and takes precedence over manufacturing and external trade. Once 
subsistence is achieved, the most effective (that is, growth-enhancing) advances in production are 
best obtained by developing manufactures, as it is in these activities that division of labour can be 
carried out to the highest degree. Finally, external trade can allow further growth in national wealth 
even in production regimes that have fully used the advantages of division of labour in manufacturing. 
This sequence highlights the proportionality changes the economic system should introduce to 
achieve maximum growth while ensuring the sustainability of the dynamic process under 
consideration (the economy is able to replace its produced means of production from one period to 
the next). Smith’s natural progress of opulence highlights the proportionality conditions that should 
govern structural change on a sustainable (self-replacing) maximum growth trajectory. Smith 
acknowledges that these conditions may or may not be satisfied: 
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[T]hough this natural order of things must have taken place in some degree [in any society 
that had any territory], it has, in all the modern states of Europe, been, in some respects, entirely 
inverted. The foreign commerce of some of their cities has introduced all their finer manufactures, or 
such as were fit for distant sale; and manufactures and foreign commerce together, have given birth 
to the principal improvements of agriculture. (Smith, 1976 [1776], III.1.8, p. 380) 
 
Smith’s argument suggests that an economy may avoid following the ‘natural’ trajectory only 
if an alternative way of satisfying the proportionality conditions is found. The ‘progress of opulence’ 
achieved by certain medieval city states in Europe (such as Genoa, Venice, and the Hansa League 
cities) inverted the natural sequence by first developing external trade, and yet this can be 
retrospectively explained by institutional and political contexts that allowed the provision of staple 
goods in the absence of agricultural development prior to foreign commerce and manufacturing 
development. Thus, the proportionality conditions could be satisfied even in economies that were 
following a dynamic trajectory different from the natural one. 
Smith’s investigation of medium-term dynamics provides another instance of a 
proportionality condition at play. Here, however, the internal structure of the manufacturing process 
takes centre stage and the focus of explanation shifts from the identification of a law-based 
(nomological) causal mechanism to the reconstruction of a context-specific causal path5 : 
Such fluctuations [in the market price of any commodity] affect both the value and the rate 
either of wages or of profit, according as the market happens to be either overstocked or understocked 
with commodities or with labour; with work done, or with work to be done. A public mourning raises 
the price of black cloth (with which the market is almost always understocked upon such occasions), 
and augments the profits of the merchants who possess any considerable quantity of it. It has no effect 
upon the wages of the weavers. The market is understocked with commodities, not with labour; with 
work done, not with work to be done. It raises the wages of journeymen tailors. The market is here 
understocked with labour. There is an effectual demand for more labour, for more work to be done 
than can be had. It sinks the price of coloured silks and cloths, and thereby reduces the profits of the 
merchants who have any considerable quantity of them upon hand. It sinks, too, the wages of the 
workmen employed in preparing such commodities, for which all demand is stopped for six months, 
perhaps for a twelvemonth. The market is here over-stocked both with commodities and with labour. 
(Smith, 1976 [1776], I.7.19). 
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The above passage calls attention to the proportionality criterion that needs to be satisfied if a 
production structure is to adjust to changing demand conditions while also meeting existing structural 
invariance constraints. The distinction between ‘work done’ and ‘work to be done’ highlights the time 
structure of the production process considered as a sequence of fabrication stages (Bianchi, 1984; see 
also Landesmann and Scazzieri, 1996). Any given stage of fabrication may alternatively hinder or 
allow further transformations depending on the way in which the precedence pattern between 
subsequent fabrication stages is arranged (Scazzieri, 1993). Smith’s analysis of medium-term 
dynamics highlights structural change as a process in time (see also Hagemann and Scazzieri, 2009). 
This turns relative structural invariances into a condition that determines different speeds of 
adjustment across different forms of production organisation. 
Ricardo’s approach to economic dynamics is close to Smith’s in that it allows a distinction 
between the identification of a causal mechanism (that is, of proportionality conditions determining 
the range of feasible transformations) and the reconstruction of a causal path (that is, of the sequence 
of transformation stages following a given trigger and unfolding under given proportionality 
conditions). Ricardo’s theory of capital accumulation, growth and rent formation under limited 
availability of agricultural land addresses structural change from the standpoint of the proportionality 
conditions that constrain the economic system along a dynamic trajectory in which more costly 
techniques are added to less costly techniques as the social product is increased (Ricardo, 1951 
[1817], Chapter II ‘On Rent’; see also Quadrio Curzio, 1967, 1986, 1996; Scazzieri, 1993; Scazzieri, 
Baranzini and Rotondi, 2015): 
 
On the first settling of a country, in which there is an abundance of rich and fertile land, a very 
small proportion of which is required to be cultivated for the support of the actual population, or 
indeed can be cultivated with the capital which the population can command, there will be no rent; 
for no one would pay for the sue of land, when there was an abundant quantity not yet appropriated, 
and, therefore, at the disposal of whosoever might choose to cultivate it […] If all land had the same 
properties, if it were unlimited in quantity, and uniform in quality, no charge could be made for its 
use, unless where it possessed peculiar advantages of situation. It is only, then, because land is not 
unlimited in quantity and uniform in quality, and because in the progress of population, land of an 
inferior quality, or less advantageously situated, is called into cultivation, that rent is ever paid for the 
use of it. When in the progress of society, land of the second degree of fertility is taken into 
cultivation, rent immediately commences on that of the first quality, and the amount of that rent will 




This approach highlights the dynamics of economic structure in the light of proportionality 
conditions and land availability constraints requiring the economy to introduce discrete changes of 
production technique as the scale of production is continuously increased. Limited land availability 
under the proportionality conditions associated with a given technology in use may lead to one or 
another decreasing returns trajectory depending on the way economic actors are assumed to deliver 
an increasing agricultural output in a given institutional setting. Ricardo’s decreasing returns 
trajectory reflects the working of technological proportionality and land availability conditions under 
the assumption that economic dynamics is triggered by capitalist entrepreneurs acting in a perfectly 
competitive setting. Under this assumption, the rate of profits is equalized across the different 
production techniques in operation independently of their respective cost effectiveness, and rents arise 
(at different rates) for all techniques more cost-effective than the marginal one. The above set of 
assumptions generates the classical Ricardian decreasing returns trajectory, along which increasing 
levels of agricultural output are associated with a decreasing rate of profits (uniform across all 
techniques in use) and with an increasing total rent income, even if the latter is unevenly distributed 
across the different techniques depending on their respective degree of cost effectiveness. Actions 
and institutions different from those assumed by Ricardo’s would generate decreasing returns 
trajectories different from the one described above. For what concerns institutions, for example, if 
the rate of profit is inversely related to the unit wage, there will be a degree of freedom that would 
make the economy follow one or another dynamic trajectory depending on the income distribution 
between wages and profits (Quadrio Curzio, 1967, 1996, pp. 119-122). For what concerns actions, 
Ricardo’s dynamic trajectory assumes that capitalists cultivate additional land following the order of 
fertility, rather than another criterion. Therefore, proportionality conditions and availability 
constraints highlight a set of feasible motions within economic structure. These motions mutually 
constrain one another so that the economy can only move within a limited range of feasible 
transformations. However, proportionality conditions and availability constraints are not enough to 
determine the trajectory the economy will follow under given circumstances. The Ricardian 
decreasing returns trajectory is only one of the different structural dynamics the economy may follow 
when the set of techniques is given and the availability of primary (non-produced) resources is 
limited, depending on different assumptions about institutions and actions (Scazzieri, 1993; Quadrio 
Curzio and Pellizzari, 2018). 
The chapter of Ricardo’s Principles devoted to the analysis of the ‘temporary reverses and 
contingencies, produced by the removal of capital form one employment to another’ (Ricardo, 1951 
[1817], Chapter XIX ‘On Sudden Changes in the Channels of Trade, p. 263’) switches from long-
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term to medium-term dynamics and investigates the causal path triggered by a ‘revulsion of trade’ 
under proportionality constraints that generate a definite time sequence of adjustments along the 
transitional path followed by the economy in its motion from one settled situation to another: 
The commencement of war after a long peace, or of peace after a long war, generally produces 
considerable distress in trade. It changes in a great degree the nature of the employment to which the 
respective capitals of countries were before devoted, and during the intervals while they are settling 
in the situations which new circumstances have made the most beneficial, much fixed capital is 
unemployed, perhaps wholly lost, and labourers are without full employment […] In rich and 
powerful countries, where large capitals are invested in machinery, more distress will be experienced 
from a revulsion in trade, than in poorer countries where there is proportionally a much smaller 
amount of fixed, and a much larger amount of circulating capital, and where consequently more work 
is done by the labour of men. It is not so difficult to withdraw a circulating as a fixed capital, from 
any employment in which it may be engaged. It is often impossible to divert the machinery which 
may have been erected for one manufacture, to the purposes of another. (Ricardo, 1951 [1817], pp. 
265-266) 
 
Ricardo’s approach to the medium-term dynamics triggered by ‘the commencement of war 
after a long peace, or of peace after a long war’ is remarkably similar to Smith’s analysis of the 
consequences of a ‘public mourning’ as in both cases the productive structure of the economy is 
supposed to follow a definite time path of adjustment. Both Smith and Ricardo highlight that different 
speeds of adjustment are associated with different structures of the production process. In Smith, the 
speed of medium-term structural change is higher the greater the proportion of work to be done to 
work done; in Ricardo, structural change is swifter in the case of a high proportion of circulating to 
fixed capital. In either case, relative structural invariance determines the time profile of structural 
change. 
In conclusion, classical economic theory highlights the role of proportionality conditions in 
explaining both long-term and medium-term structural change. Long-term dynamics is addressed 
highlighting the hierarchy of motions of different subsystems in the economy (say, of different 
industries). This hierarchy reflects the interdependencies between subsystems and is independent of 
specific dynamic impulses (such as Smith’s ‘public mourning’, Ricardo’s ‘commencement of war 
after a long peace, or of peace after a long war’, or a change in production technique). Medium-terms 
dynamics is investigated considering the sequence of stages characterizing the dynamic trajectory of 
the economy as it moves from one settled position to another. This sequence reflects both the dynamic 
impulse and the bottlenecks due to the hierarchy of motions, for these bottlenecks constrain the way 
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in which the impulse works itself out within the existing structure. In short, proportionality conditions 
determine the range of motions and transformations that are feasible in the medium- and long-term 
for an economy affected by a dynamic impulse, such as population increase under limited land 
availability or increasing extent of the market. At the same time, the structural change trajectory 
followed by the economy would reflect the interplay between those feasible motions and specific if 
sometimes implicit assumptions concerning, for example, capitalists’ actions on a Ricardian 
decreasing returns trajectory or a modular social structure allowing the reshuffling of labour patterns 
and labour specialization on a Smithian increasing returns trajectory6. 
 
2.2  Economic Fluctuations and Medium-Term Dynamics 
The horizontal scheme of circular interdependence between productive sectors (or 
‘industries’) and the vertical scheme of one-way linkages between the construction of capital goods 
and the utilization of those goods to produce final products are fundamental building blocks of a 
structural theory of medium-term dynamics7.  The integration of the two schemes is necessary once 
we consider the conditions for the synchronization over time of interdependent production processes 
employing capital goods of different time durations and turnover periods. The analysis of these 
conditions identifies relative structural invariance as a principal feature of economic fluctuations, 
which provides an analytical bridge between classical economic theories and the later theories of 
medium-term dynamics (see also Cardinale and Scazzieri, 2017). The Classical Economists identified 
the tension between the conditions for the dynamic synchronization of a production economy and the 
different degrees of durability of productive assets (such as the different degrees of durability of 
circulating vs. fixed capital goods). Karl Marx worked in this analytical tradition and highlighted the 
time asymmetries between elements of production as the technical condition leading to the medium-
term dynamics of an industrial economy.  Different turnover periods between circulating (fluid) 
capital and fixed capital are of central importance: ‘[t]he fluid capital entering the production process 
transfers its whole value to the product, and must therefore be constantly replaced in kind by the sale 
of that product, if the production process is to continue without interruption. The fixed capital entering 
the production process transfers only part of its value (the wear and tear) to the product, and continues 
                                                          
6 In a modular social structure any actor ‘had to choose his productive activity and his methods independently, in the light 
of his own aims and assessments of the circumstances, rather than have them dictated by his status, his location in the 
social hierarchy, his guild membership and so forth’ (Gellner, 1998, p. 26). 
7 The circular scheme goes back to Quesnay’s Tableau économique (Quesnay, 1758) and Marx’s reproduction schemes 
(Marx, 1978 [1887]).  Its current analytical formulation is due to the work of scholars such as Wassily Leontief (1928, 
1941) Jan von Neumann (1935-37), Piero Sraffa (1960). The vertical scheme goes back to the classical Austrian analysis 
of the time-structure of production (Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Hayek, 1931, 2008 [1941]). Methods to integrate circular and 
vertical approaches to production interdependencies are outlined in   Nurkse (1935), Pasinetti (1980 [1973], 1988),   
Quadrio Curzio (1975, 1986), Lowe (1976), Hicks (1985), Landesmann and Scazzieri (1996), Baldone (1996), Quadrio 
Curzio and Pellizzari (1999, 2018), and Cardinale and Scazzieri (2016).  
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to function in the production process despite this wear and tear; hence it only needs to be replaced in 
kind at shorter or longer intervals, in any case not as often as the fluid capital’ (Marx, 1978 [1887], 
p. 262).  Fixed capital items do not need frequent replacement as circulating capital items, which 
entails the mismatch between the dates of physical replacement for fixed capital.  This leads Marx to 
highlight reinvestment cycles of fixed capital as the ‘material foundations for the periodic cycle in 
which business passes through successive periods of stagnation, moderate activity, overexcitement 
and crisis’ (Marx, 1978 [1887], p. 264).  This technical constraint works in the socio-institutional 
setting of a capitalist economy, which is characterized by the ‘constant revolutionizing of the means 
of production, which […] increases steadily with the development of the capitalist mode of 
production’ (Marx, 1978 [1887], p. 264). The medium-term dynamics of a capitalist economy is 
triggered by the interplay of material (technical) and economic conditions. Reinvestment cycles are 
different for different fixed capital goods. On the other hand, technical progress (the ‘constant 
revolutionizing of the means of production’) reduces the turnover periods of fixed capital items. The 
combination of different reinvestment cycles durations and technical progress determines the overall 
instability of industrial capitalism. In this institutional setting, economic crises (as distinct from pure 
reinvestment cycles) are the consequence of the greater immobilizations of liquidity between 
replacement times of fixed capital items and of the large amounts of liquidity made available in a 
discontinuous way during technological revolutions.  
The role of fixed capital items and the discontinuous character of their liquidation phases is at 
the core of Mykhaylo Ivanovich Tugan Baranovsky’s study of industrial crises in England (Tugan 
Baranovski, 1894; 1913 [1900]). In this work, Tugan Baranovsky highlights that modern industrial 
technology leads to a specific allocation of liquidity between circulating and fixed capital. This 
allocation of liquidity leads to the uneven distribution of investment across production processes 
characterized by different time profiles and makes possible the mismatch between the capital 
available and the capital in use at any specific phase of the trade cycle. This framework provides the 
analytical starting point of Tugan Baranovsky’s reconstruction of industrial crises in England. 
Economic structure is characterized by ‘the reciprocal dependence, in the capitalist economic order, 
of the industrial branches upon one another’ (Tugan Baranovsky, 1913 [1900], p. 257). This 
‘reciprocal dependence’ makes every production to generate ‘a demand for other commodities […] 
In order to produce new commodities, it is necessary to have raw materials, means of production, 
consumer goods for workers. The expansion of production in any branch thus generates the demand 
for commodities produced by other industries. In this way, the impulse that determines the production 
increase spreads from one industrial branch to another’ (Tugan Baranovsky, 1913 [1900], pp. 257-
258). Interdependence makes possible different dynamic patterns and propagation mechanisms 
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depending on the stage of technological and economic development. Production technologies 
involving a high proportion of fixed to circulating capital explain ‘why, in periods of expanding fixed 
capital investment, one witnesses a generalized increase of demand for all commodities’ (Tugan 
Baranovsky, 1913 [1900], pp. 257-58). Fixed capital investment leads to time asymmetries between 
the response mechanisms of different sectors to given impulses (such as an increase or fall of 
consumer demand). At the same time, liquidity formation in a capitalist economy results from actions 
that are to a large extent independent of the specific investment requirements of sectors: ‘The greatest 
part of the loanable capitals available on the market does not derive from individual incomes; it is 
formed by capitalized incomes that, for one reason or another, have not been invested at their source. 
Now, one should not confuse the accumulation of this loanable capital with the growth of productive 
capital’ (Tugan Baranovsky, 1913 [1900], pp. 258-59). Therefore, medium-term dynamics is 
characterized by the non-proportional expansion of productive capital across industrial sectors. This 
is due to the joint working of technical conditions (liquidity immobilizations in fixed capital goods) 
and economic actions independent of the reinvestment requirements of the fixed capital goods sector. 
The resulting medium-term dynamics is characterized by fluctuations in the level of economic activity 
different from the reinvestment cycles of fixed capital goods (machinery). Yet, investment in 
machinery makes the price of iron a particularly informative indicator of the state of the economy 
during fluctuations in activity levels: 
 ‘[t]he most characteristic feature of industrial fluctuations is the coincidence of the extremely 
regular movement of the price of iron with the phases of the industrial cycle: in the phase of economic 
expansion the price of iron is invariably high, whereas in the phase of industrial stagnation it is 
extremely low’ (Tugan Baranovsky, 1913 [1900], p. 252).  
The responsiveness of iron prices to changes in the level of economic activity reflects implicit 
assumptions concerning the interplay of the structural conditions determining the order of motion of 
different types of production with the actions of entrepreneurs reacting to an increase in the 
profitability of investment in the fixed capital goods sector relative to that in the consumer goods 
sector. In an economy moving towards the downturn, the higher relative profitability of investment 
in fixed capital goods makes investment in these goods attractive to loanable funds (Tugan 
Baranovsky, 1913 [1900], pp. 253-254). However, saving decisions are independent of investment 
decisions, so that it is necessary to assume a specific match between savers’ and investors’ behavior 
to generate the medium-term dynamics characterizing Tugan Baranovsky’s trade cycle.  This means 
that entrepreneurs’ propensity to invest needs to match the availability of loanable funds. In addition, 
institutional conditions must allow entrepreneurs to invest according to the relative profitability of 
investment in the different sectors of the economy. In short, ‘[d]uring the phases of prosperity, the 
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new fixed capital of society is being created. Social industry as a whole takes a new direction: the 
fabrication of means of production moves to the foreground. The production of iron, machines, tools, 
ship, building materials, becomes much more important than in the past. Eventually, the construction 
of the new fixed capitals is completed: we have new factories, new houses, new ships, and new 
railways. However, at this point new enterprises become less frequent. There a fall of demand for all 
materials entering the formation of fixed capital. The distribution of production is no longer 
proportional [across productive sectors]: machine tools, iron, tiles, and wood for construction are in 
less demand than in the past since new enterprises are less frequent. However, the producers of means 
of production cannot withdraw their capital from their enterprises, and the importance of capital 
invested in constructions, machinery and so forth is such that production is made to continue [...] We 
have thus overproduction of means of production. The different industrial branches are dependent 
upon each other, and partial overproduction leads to general overproduction’ (Tugan Baranovsky, 
1913 [1900], p. 271). 
Mentor Bouniatian takes a similar view of the relationship between technical constraints and 
socioeconomic dynamics. He emphasizes that, when economic expansion ends, there is shortage of 
liquidity as shortage of free purchasing power due to ‘overcapitalization’ (Bouniatian, 1922 [1907], 
pp. 262-269). At this time, ‘the national economy has at its disposal means of production greatly in 
excess of the possibility of full and profitable utilization under the consumption conditions resulting 
from the existing economic structure, mode of production and realization, distribution of wealth and 
accumulation of capital’ (Bouniatian, 1922 [1907], p. 269). In this case, liquidity shortage reflects a 
social condition rather than a technical bottleneck.  For overcapitalization ‘does not mean that capital 
quantitatively exceeds the level above which it cannot find employment in an absolute sense […] 
[W]hat is essential is that the absolute value of capital does not correspond any longer, under the 
given conditions of consumption, to the standards existing when that capital was formed. We are 
dealing here with a phenomenon of a social character’ (Bouniatian, 1922 [1907], pp. 269-70). The 
interplay of technical and social conditions is also apparent in the way the economic downturn brings 
about a correction of overcapitalization. Here two distinct mechanisms are at work. On the one hand, 
‘superfluous capital’ starts being scrapped as soon as ‘overproduction and selling difficulties begin 
to appear’ (Bouniatian, 1922 [1907], p. 270). On the other hand, falling prices during the crisis bring 
about a change in the ‘distribution and utilization of purchasing power’ (Bouniatian,1922 [1907], p. 
275). This is because falling prices ‘bring about a fall in the purchasing power of producers and 
capitalists to the advantage of the class of consumers at large. This diffusion of purchasing power 
encourages consumption exactly as its concentration in an expansion period would have stimulated 
capital accumulation’ (Bouniatian, 1922 [1907], p. 275). To sum up, Bouniatian considers the tension 
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between individual motives and social constraints as the most important trigger of periodical crises: 
the ‘unlimited tendency to accumulate within individual economic units would clash with the 
existence of a check upon social capitalization when ‘social consumption’ does not grow at the same 
rate as private capital accumulation’ (Bouniatian, 1922 [1907], p. 361). At the root of this tension 
between individual actions and social outcomes is the dual character of the accumulation of capital 
in a private ownership economy. Private capital accumulation is necessary condition to the survival 
of individual capitalists8. But accumulation can take two different avenues: ‘First, through the 
creation of productive goods; second, through the acquisition of priority rights in the distribution of 
the social product resulting from possession of real elements of production [...] or in the acquisition 
of rights on the property and incomes of other individuals’ (Bouniatian, 1922 [1907], p. 317). The 
consequences of this dichotomy are far reaching: ‘In the former case, there is formation of social 
capital, that is, society as a whole becomes better endowed through productive installations and 
commodity reserves that increase the social product. In the latter case, there is accumulation of a 
purely private capital, that is, acquisition of rights on existing sources of income to the advantage of 
particular individuals’ (Bouniatian, 1922 [1907], p. 317). In other words, there is no necessary link 
between the accumulation of private capital and the accumulation of social capital, even if the average 
rate of private capital accumulation is bounded above by the rate of increase of social capital: ‘If [an 
individual economic unit] increases its capital in a non-proportional way relative to its own 
consumption, this is only possible if other units correspondingly increase their consumption, or, in 
the case of constant [aggregate] consumption, if the capital of other economic units is excluded from 
production to a corresponding degree’ (Bouniatian, 1922 [1907], p. 320). This relationship is the root 
mechanism generating economic crises: ‘[w]hen this tendency towards the accumulation of capital 
without a corresponding increase of consumption develops in all economic units, or in many those 
units, [this tendency] would necessarily lead to general overcapitalization’ (Bouniatian, 1922 [1907], 
p. 320)9. The lack of correspondence between private and social capital accumulation is also central 
to explaining the recurrence of crises in the world economy: ‘the different national economies find 
themselves, from the point of view of the struggle for capitalization, in the same situation of private 
economic enterprises if each one of them were individually considered’ (Bouniatian, 1922 [1907], p. 
371; see also Bouniatian, 1928; Besomi, 2007). The lack of correspondence between private and 
                                                          
8 As noted by Albert Schäffle ‘[t]he capitalist is bound to die in his violent struggle for existence with stronger rivals 
unless he is constantly increasing his capital’ (Schäffle, 1896, tome II, p. 281; see also Bouniatian, 1922 [1907]). 
9 Bouniatian’s argument is closely related to John Maynard Keynes’s later criticism of the fallacy of composition: ‘I have 
called my theory a general theory. I mean by this that I am chiefly concerned with the behavior of the economic system 
as a whole, - with aggregate incomes, aggregate profits, aggregate output, aggregate employment, aggregate investment, 
aggregate saving […] And I argue that important mistakes have been made through extending to the system as a whole 




social accumulation in each economy individually considered finds a counterpart in that between 
private and social accumulation across different economies. This dichotomy is responsible for 
recurrent overcapitalization crises at the level of the world economy. As a result, it is possible to 
overcome economic crises only when the distribution of saving and investment actions across the 
different actors in the economy (or across the different national economies) allows social 
consumption to be adjusted to the overall rate of capital accumulation. 
The interplay of structural constraints and assumptions on actions and institutions also 
characterizes subsequent contributions to the theory of medium-term dynamics, such as those of 
Friedrich August von Hayek and John Hicks. Hayek’s explanation if medium-term fluctuations is 
based on the consideration of structural adjustment to the production process resulting from ‘any sort 
of change’ (Hayek, 2008 [1941], p. 275). A clear appraisal of the dual explanation needed for the 
analysis of medium-term structural dynamics is outlined in Chapter 23 of Hayek’s Pure Theory of 
Capital, which is devoted to ‘The Effects of Unforeseen Changes and in Particular of Inventions’. 
There Hayek considers ‘the case where the absolute amount of operating costs, as well as their relative 
share in the total cost of a unit of the product, is greater in the case of the new process than in the case 
of the old process’ (Hayek, 2008 [1941], p. 292). Under these essentially technical conditions, ‘what 
actually happens is that, as the old equipment wears out and is replaced by equipment requiring the 
investment of a smaller amount of input, but co-operating with a greater amount of current input, the 
aggregate of the investment periods of this input is shortened… [S]ince in the aggregate (or on 
average) this input would mature sooner than it did in the past, the flow of the final services obtained 
from it would not dovetail but would partly overlap with those of the old equipment’ (Hayek, 2008 
[1941], p. 293). Under these conditions, ‘it will be necessary to reinvest in the new equipment at a 
slower rate but over a longer period’ to avoid a situation in which ‘the supply of [output by the new 
process] would temporarily be increased beyond the level at which it could be permanently 
maintained’ (Hayek, 2008 [1941], p. 293). Therefore, Hayek’s approach highlights conditions about 
actions that are necessary in order to maintain the economic system’s ability to reproduce itself at a 
given level of activity.  
Hicks’s theory of the medium term is focused on analysis of the transitional path (traverse) 
from one fully settled position to another after a source of change shifts the economy away from its 
previous trajectory (Hicks, 1973, 1977, 1985). A characterizing feature of Hicks’s traverse analysis 
is the consideration of the technical bottlenecks due to the time-profile of capital-using processes, 
which leads him to distinguish between a ‘construction phase’ and a ‘utilization phase’ of the 
production process. This time structure introduces a precedence pattern between stages of the 
production process and determines a sequence of feasible trajectories, which the economy may or 
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may not follow depending on actions and institutions. Hicks’s way of selecting specific transitional 
paths out of a variety of feasible trajectories is by introducing assumptions that make a single 
trajectory possible. This approach leads him to investigate two alternative transitional paths, 
respectively called ‘Full Performance’ (or ‘Fixwage’) Path and ‘Full Employment’ Path (Hicks, 
1973). The former is a traverse on which ‘the wage is given exogenously- being determined in some 
way outside the model’ and a ‘perfectly elastic supply of labour, at the given wage, must […] be 
included’ (Hicks, 1973, p. 48) while on the latter ‘the rate of expansion of the labour supply is given, 
and the whole of the given labour force is to be kept fully employed’ (Hicks, 1973, p. 48). The ‘Full 
Performance’ Path is a structural change trajectory close to Smith’s and Ricardo’s assumptions on 
medium-term dynamics; it assumes that capitalists’ saving behaviour allows the full utilization of the 
economic system’s productive capacity. The ‘Full Employment’ Path, in contrast, could be the 
structural change trajectory of an economy in which policy-makers pursue Keynesian full 
employment policies. In either case, medium-term dynamics is determined by actions and institutions 
that keep the economy on a given transitional path to the exclusion of other paths that may be feasible 
under the existing technical conditions.  
 
 
2.3. Structural Economic Dynamics 
Classical political economy explains structural change in terms of proportionality conditions 
determining the way existing structures adjust to temporary or persistent sources of change. As we 
have seen, the classical approach to medium-term dynamics sees structural change as a sequence of 
transformation stages leading the economy from one settled position to another along a trajectory 
driven by some initial disturbance. In contrast, the classical approach to long-term dynamics views 
structural change as a trajectory in which economic structure is modified because of a persistent 
change of fundamental parameters (be it the pattern of division of labour between productive 
processes, or the scarcities of different resources). In short, medium-term dynamics investigates the 
adjustment process between different settled positions of the economy, whereas long-term dynamics 
considers the dynamic trajectory generated by the succession of settled positions associated with a 
corresponding succession of fundamental parameters. In medium-term dynamics, structural change 
is explained by identifying the hierarchy of motions that constrains economic dynamics within a 
feasible range following a given disturbance. This hierarchy reflects a condition of relative structural 
invariance but is not by itself enough to determine the dynamic course of the economy, which requires 
specific assumptions on actors’ behaviour following the initial disturbance. In contrast, when it comes 
to explaining long-term structural change, classical theories take a different route. In this case, 
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structural change is explained by constructing an analytical template showing how economic structure 
would change if we were to assume the persistent operation of some dynamic principle such as 
Smith’s division of labour, or Ricardo’s increasing use of lands of inferior quality. The classical 
theory of long-term structural change highlights trajectories that may be different from the dynamic 
paths followed by real economies. Thus, Smith’s ‘natural progress of opulence’ may be inverted if 
external trade and manufacturing are developed before the primary sector, and Ricardo’s decreasing 
returns trajectory may be avoided if enough land of the most fertile type is available. However, the 
analytical template constructed in terms of specific assumptions may be used to identify the 
conditions under which alternative trajectories are feasible.  
Modern theories of long-term structural change follow the classical approach by considering 
hypothetical trajectories instead of actual processes of adjustment to changing conditions. However, 
a characterizing feature of those theories is the explicit distinction between different layers of 
economic structure. Luigi Pasinetti’s ‘separation theorem’ is a case in point (Pasinetti, 2007). 
Pasinetti distinguishes between a ‘fundamental’ level of investigation that addresses the persistent 
and general features of an industrial economy, and a level of investigation addressing features of 
economic structures that are more contingent and likely to reflect specific historical and institutional 
contexts. This approach builds on classical political economy but introduces a profound change with 
respect to its original focus. For in this case the theory of long-term structural dynamics is explicitly 
removed from the analysis of the actual historical changes it nevertheless aims to explain (Pasinetti, 
1981, Chapter 10). Pasinetti’s separation between the ‘natural’ and the ‘institutional’ features of the 
economy brings to light a distinction that was already implicit in the classical approach. It also makes 
it possible to explain structural change in a new light, as it distinguishes between the proportionality 
conditions embedded in existing structures and the human actions that are required to drive the 
economy along a specific trajectory. One important consequence of that distinction is recognition that 
the proportionality conditions, which are themselves an expression of relative structural invariance, 
are compatible with a variety of dynamic trajectories. Pasinetti examines in detail the structural 
change trajectory (which he calls ‘natural’) that allows full employment of the labour force and full 
utilization of productive capacity under conditions of technical progress and Engel-law type changes 
of consumer preferences. However, he also acknowledges that the ‘natural’ dynamics may not be the 
one followed by the economy (Pasinetti, 1981, Chapter 10). In conclusion, the distinction between 
‘natural’ dynamics and actual dynamics highlights the open-endedness of structural constraints and 
the plurality of trajectories the economy may follow subject to any given set of productive 
interdependencies. A Pasinetti-type economy may or may not follow the structural changes required 
on the ‘natural’ path depending on whether the actions that take place in that economy are or are not 
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consistent with Pasinetti’s fundamental macroeconomic condition for full employment and full 
capacity utilization.  If they are not, the economy may follow a plurality of structural change 
trajectories that are consistent with the evolution of structural parameters (production coefficients and 
per capita consumption coefficients) without achieving full employment and full capacity 
utilization10.  
The distinction between the hypothetical trajectory allowing a ‘desired’ state to be attained 
and the multiplicity of alternative trajectories open to the economy subject to given proportionality 
conditions is further explored by Alberto Quadrio Curzio Quadrio Curzio highlights that limited 
availability of non-produced means of production (such as land or energy sources) constrains the 
economy to follow a structural change trajectory using increasingly less effective (i.e., costlier) 
techniques as the overall scale of production is increased. A remarkable feature of this investigation 
is that, contrary to the original decreasing returns trajectory considered by Ricardo, here a variety of 
trajectories is shown to be feasible, under any given set of technological parameters, depending on 
the type of distribution between different income categories (wages, profits and rents). Changes in 
income distribution may be associated with changes in the efficiency ranking of techniques, which 
may in turn lead to changes in the activation sequence of the different techniques along a trajectory 
aimed at achieving maximum feasible growth. This analysis highlights the uneven pattern of 
structural change under scarcity constraints due to the interdependencies between production 
processes. It also shows that intermediate goods that are redundant under certain technological 
conditions (thereby generating residuals) may again become usable in a different technological setting 
(Quadrio Curzio, 1986; Quadrio Curzio and Pellizzari, 1999). In this case, the same structural change 
trajectory may show alternating phases of decreasing and increasing returns depending on whether 
the dominating influence is the switch to less effective (i.e., costlier) technique or the possibility of 
using residuals to increase the economy’s growth rate. The cleavage between what is feasible under 
any given set of productive interdependencies and what can happen depending on institutional 
conditions and actors’ objectives is a characteristic feature of this investigation (Quadrio Curzio and 
Pellizzari, 2018). The structural dynamics trajectory followed by any given economy is shown to 
reflect both the technological interdependencies between production processes and the institutional 
and historical conditions influencing the objectives of “macro decision-makers” and the actual 
sequence by which production structures are changed. 
                                                          
10 Therefore, specific assumptions on actions and institutions are required to ‘close’ structural dynamics along a 
determinate path. This is shown, for example, in Paolo Leon’s theory of structural dynamics under capitalist conditions, 
in which the economy can follow a trajectory of proportional changes consistent with Engel’s law subject to the condition 
of foresightedness of capitalists as a social group (Leon, 1967). 
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The foregoing analysis suggests that interdependencies bring about a range of feasible 
transformations, which human actions may or may not take up depending on actors’ objectives. This 
distinction highlights that explaining structural change must follow a dual route depending on whether 
we consider the structural constraints determining which dynamic trajectories are feasible or the 
dynamic triggers driving the economy along a specific sequence of transformation stages. Both 
approaches are needed, because explaining structural change requires both the identification of the 
causal mechanism associated with the existing set of interdependencies and the reconstruction of the 
specific causal path followed by the economy. The above two components of structural change are 
associated with two different ways of representing economic structure. The interdependence between 
production processes of the same time length (or assumed to be so) highlight a ‘horizontal’ causal 
mechanism in which processes are mutually related in terms of a proportionality condition that allows 
achievement of a systemic objective such as the ‘viability’ of the set of interdependent processes. On 
the other hand, the relationship between processes (of the same duration or of different durations) that 
are hierarchically related along a sequence of production stages highlights a ‘vertical’ causal 
mechanism, in which processes are mutually related in terms of a proportionality condition governing 
the rate at which throughput (the flow of goods-in-process) moves from one stage of production to 
the next. The two causal mechanisms presuppose different proportionality conditions but are jointly 
at work behind any causal process in which structural transformation takes place. 
Adolph Lowe’s analysis of structural change combines horizontal and vertical representations 
of interdependence and highlights the intertwining of horizontal and vertical mismatches along a 
structural transformation path (Lowe, 1976).  Lowe’s representation of productive interdependences 
in an industrial economy (his ‘schema of industrial production’) leads him to consider the economy 
as ‘vertically divided into two sectors: equipment-good industries […] and consumer-good industries 
[…] described as Sector I and Sector II, respectively’ (Lowe, 1976, p. 31). This analytical 
representation highlights the coexistence of vertical and horizontal product flows coordinated with 
one another. The transformation flow from natural resources to finished consumer goods presupposes 
for its continuity a horizontal flow from equipment-goods industries (Sector I) to consumer-goods 
industries (Sector II) that must be large enough to replace the equipment used up during vertical 
transformation in the consumer-goods industries (Sector II). Similarly, Sector I must allow a vertical 
transformation flow that is large enough to replace the equipment goods used up in this sector. 
However, ‘there is an important difference between the two sectors regarding the horizontal flow. In 
sector II it is a horizontal flow from Sector I that replaces the worn-out equipment. In Sector I the 
currently used-up equipment is replaced from the output of that sector itself, more precisely, from the 
output of Subsector Ia. In other words, the horizontal flow consists of a portion of the vertical flow 
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“turned back”, that is, it is a circular flow’ (Lowe, 1976, p. 33)11. This approach allows Lowe to 
distinguish between ‘structure analysis’ and ‘force analysis’, where ‘structure analysis’ investigates 
‘the configurations in which the elements  of an economic system  […] must be arranged if the 
transformation of the initial into the stipulated terminal state  is to be achieved’ (Lowe, 1976, p. 17), 
while ‘force analysis’  studies ‘the patterns of behaviour or motivation  that initiate and sustain the 
motion of the system along the structurally determined path’ (Lowe, 1976, p. 17)12.  
Lowe’s distinction suggests a conclusion that can be extended to structural change analysis as 
a whole: any structural change process presupposes both the ‘horizontal’ proportionality condition 
characterizing a set of mutually related processes, and the ‘vertical’ proportionality condition 
characterizing a sequence of temporally related production stages. However, combined horizontal 
and vertical constraints are not enough to determine the structural change trajectory. Actions are 
necessary to move from open-ended dynamics to specific paths of structural change. 
 
3. Bridging Medium- and Long-Term Dynamics: Towards Causal Pluralism 
The foregoing analysis suggests that theories of structural change highlight two different, but 
closely intertwined, approaches to explaining the transformation of economic structure. One approach 
looks at structure in terms of a system of interdependencies (a causal mechanism) in which the change 
of certain magnitudes (such as the unit wage or the rate of technical progress) is associated with 
changes in other magnitudes (such as the system of relative prices)  by virtue of a proportionality 
condition that binds together the different parts of the economy under a given systemic objective 
(such as the need to reintegrate productive capacity or to achieve full employment). In this case, 
structural change is explained by the proportionality condition needed to achieve the systemic 
objective (say, to achieve full employment) once the change of certain external circumstances is 
assumed (be it a different population growth rate, a new production technique, or a new energy 
source). This explanation is relative to the systemic condition the economy is assumed to achieve 
(such as the ability to reintegrate productive capacity, or full employment) but does not address the 
process by which structural change may take place.  The other approach looks at structural change as 
a sequence of transformation stages (a causal path). This sequence is triggered by a given dynamic 
impulse (say, a new production technique, or a new energy source) that drives the economy from one 
state to another through a sequence of bottlenecks that reflects the hierarchy of feasible motions in 
                                                          
11 Sector I (the equipment-good sector) is itself divided into two subsectors: subsector Ia, which produces equipment used 
in sector I (equipment-good sector) and sector II (consumer-good sector), and subsector Ib, which produces equipment 
used in sector II only. 
12 This approach is related to Lowe’s concept of ‘instrumental analysis’, which is a type of investigation that ‘starts out 
not from an observed but from a postulated terminal state’ (Lowe, 1977, p. 146; author’s emphasis) and ‘extracts’ from 
knowledge of the internal structure of the economic system the means to achieve that state. 
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the economy. In this case, structural change is explained by the interplay of two different causal 
mechanisms: (i) the proportionality condition determining the precedence relations between the 
different types of motion in the economy (Myrdal, 1939) (say, which components of productive 
capacity need to increase to allow the increase of other components to take place), and (ii) the actions 
and institutions that may drive the economy across a given sequence of transformations out of those 
which are possible given the aforementioned precedence relations. This explanation is grounded in 
the consideration of motive forces and bottlenecks, which in turn reflect the hierarchical arrangement 
of processes within the system in which transformation takes place. 
Therefore, plural causality is at work in processes of structural change, and this requires a 
multi-level approach to explanation. The economy’s architecture is built on different sets of 
proportionality conditions, and each set may be associated with a different structural specification of 
the economy (such as the horizontal and the vertical specifications discussed above). Any given 
source of change (say, a change of fashion or a technical innovation) may initiate a process of 
transformations in which both horizontal and vertical constraints are at play, and in which the 
economy follows a succession of transformation stages compatible with the ‘order of sequence’ 
(Myrdal, 1939, p. 27) characterizing its set of feasible motions. Multiple constraints and triggers may 
be in operation at any given time, so that explaining structural change may require the identification 
of distinct causal paths, and the investigation of the interaction and feedback mechanisms linking one 
causal path to another. 
Albert Aftalion’s theory of economic fluctuations is an instance of the plural causality at work 
under structural change (Aftalion,1913). Aftalion starts with a vertical specification of economic 
structure, in which the economy is decomposed into several vertically integrated sectors, each one 
associated with production of a final consumer good, and each one including the fabrication of its 
own capital equipment. A source of change arising from final consumer demand (say, a change in 
fashion) is likely to trigger a succession of transformation stages at which the economy would respond 
differently depending on which sectors and/or stages of production are primarily affected.  The 
simultaneous existence of vertical constraints linking each production stage to the next and of 
horizontal constraints linking intermediate goods to a variety of different production lines are at the 
root of the uneven responses of sectors and/or production stages to sources of change.  For example, 
in a predominantly vertical production structure (a structure in which technical constraints primarily 
affect the relationship between successive stages of production) ‘the price oscillations have each time 
a less acute character as one moves from one anterior to one posterior industry, from one product to 
the product that follows it, say from iron ore to cast iron, or from cast iron to iron objects’ (Aftalion, 
1913, vol. I, p. 109). However, the pattern of responses to a source of change may be different if we 
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consider a production structure relying on the supply of intermediate goods to a variety of production 
lines. In this case, ‘the prices of certain products show […] more pronounced oscillations than 
products preceding or following them’ (Aftalion, 1913, vol. I, ibidem). This is what happens for cast 
iron ‘relatively on the one hand to iron ore and on the other hand to spinning machines or finished 
products in metal’ (Aftalion, 1913, vol. I, ibidem). This also happens ‘for cotton and linen tissues 
relatively on the one hand to unwoven cotton or linen, and on the other hand to cotton fabrics and 
linen canvas’ (Aftalion, 1913, vol. I, ibidem). Horizontal linkages due to intermediate products 
provide a privileged transmission channel of changes in activity levels originating somewhere else in 
the economy. 
Fixed capital investment is at the centre of Aftalion’s theory of economic fluctuations 
(Aftalion, 1913, 1927): economic crises are ultimately explained by the longer production time of 
machinery relative to the other items of the capital stock (see also Scazzieri, 2014).  However, the 
role of fixed capital investment in triggering specific trajectories of uneven medium-term dynamics 
reflects the interplay of vertical and horizontal constraints in determining the range of feasible 
motions in the economy. Linkages between successive stages of the same process and between 
processes activated at the same time bring about a complex hierarchy constraining motions relative 
to one another. The trajectory followed by the economy reflects actors’ behaviour under the above 
set of dynamic constraints: ‘the price fall characterising the crisis and the depression is due to the 
overproduction of commodities. The price increase characterising prosperity results from 
underproduction. Human needs are more amply satisfied in one phase of the cycle. They are only 
insufficiently satisfied in the other’ (Aftalion, 1913, vol. II, p. 261). Actions carried out to achieve 
need satisfaction are central to the type of uneven dynamics that Aftalion describes: ‘what matters is 
not simply lack of equilibrium between industries, but lack of equilibrium between production and 
needs’ (Aftalion, 1913, vol. II, p. 263, emphasis original). To this Aftalion adds that ‘We know it is 
subjective estimates, different from one individual to another, which determine the unique market 
price, which is an objective phenomenon. The one thousand individual demands add up to determine 
social demand’ (Aftalion, 1913, vol. II, p. 274, added emphasis). In turn, price fluctuations trigger 
fluctuations in wages, profits and interest, which may influence the dynamics of aggregate demand: 
‘[t]he rhythm of incomes brings about a rhythm of demand that generalises, intensifies and perhaps 
lengthens the upward and downward movement of prices’ (Aftalion, 1913, vol. II, p. 400). This 
arrangement of dynamic channels highlights a multi-level causal structure characterised by feedback 
effects (‘reaction de l’effet sur la cause’, Aftalion, 1913, vol. II, p.400), which magnify the intensity 
of medium-term expansion and contraction. Fluctuations in wages, profits and interest also influence 
long-term phenomena such as demographic trends and technical innovation (Aftalion, 1913, vol. II, 
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p. 399), which may in turn affect medium-term dynamics in subsequent periods. In conclusion, 
bottom-up and top-down processes combine to determine the dynamic trajectory followed by the 
economy. This provides a bridge between sectoral and macroeconomic dynamics. It also highlights 
a possible link between medium- and long-term dynamics due to the relationship between machinery-
intensive technical change and changes in income distribution between categories of consumers. Once 
again, a plurality of causal factors is in play. On Aftalion’s assumptions, on the one hand technical 
change is likely to accelerate the substitution of capital equipment for labour, thereby increasing 
(other things equal) the likelihood of economic fluctuations. On the other hand, a contraction of the 
wage share of national income is likely to diminish (other things equal) the share of machinery-
intensive consumer goods in aggregate expenditure. This, in turn, may reduce the likelihood of 
income fluctuations at the level of the macroeconomy.  
As Jean Lhomme noted in his essay on Aftalion’s method, Aftalion’s investigations are 
pursued through ‘successive approximations’ (Lhomme, 1945, p. 29). Each level of approximation is 
essential to understanding the structural dynamics under consideration, and the successive levels of 
approximation bring structural change analysis closer to historical reality (what is being explained is 
what happened). And yet, any explanation of structural change is bound to remain open-ended ex 
ante, because it is the manifold actions on which it is based that will activate a given path of change 
out of the many that are made possible by economic structures. This is the argument to which the 
next section is devoted. 
 
4. Actions, Structures, and the Open-endedness of Structural Change 
In the foregoing sections of the article, we illustrated the open-endedness of structural change 
in the context of specific theories. We can now provide a more general theoretical argument. Whilst 
this could be done from different angles (see Cardinale, 2018c), for the purposes of the current paper, 
it is sufficient to refer to the fact that there is typically no one-to-one correspondence between a 
system of interdependencies and its analytical representation. For example, a system of 
interdependent intermediate product flows needed in each other’s production may be visualized either 
as a ‘horizontal’ system producing m intermediate goods by means of the same intermediate goods, 
or as a set of m vertically integrated sectors, in which is sector produces the intermediate goods it 
needs, and is thus independent of the other m-1 sectors (Pasinetti, 1980 [1973], 1981; Scazzieri, 
1990). In the former case, the economy may be represented by a matrix describing the intermediate 
product flows in the economy. Matrix A below describes the structure of intermediate product flows 
in a two goods economy (each element aij denotes the quantity of good i needed to produce each unity 





A    =      a11       a12                                                                                                                        (1) 
               a 21       a22 
 
In the latter case, the economy may be represented by a set of m vertically integrated sectors 
describing m lines of productive transformation that coincide with the m goods produced in the 
economy: 
 
l (I - A) -1 = v = [vi]       i = 1 ,…, k 
                                                                                                             (2)                 
A (I - A) -1 = H = [hi]      i = 1, …, k 
 
Each vertically integrated sector i is represented by a pair (vi, hi). Each vi ‘expresses in as 
consolidated way the quantity of labour directly and indirectly required in the whole economic system 
to obtain one physical unit of commodity i as a final good’ (Pasinetti, 1980 [1973], p. 20). Each vector 
hi ‘expresses in a consolidated way the series of heterogeneous physical quantities of commodities 1, 
2, …, m, which are directly and indirectly required as stock, in the whole economic system, in order 
to obtain one physical unit of commodity i as a final good (i = 1, 2, …, m). This is [a] particular 
composite commodity, which we shall call a unity of vertically integrated productive capacity for 
commodity i (i = 1, 2, …, m)’ (Pasinetti, 1980 [1973], pp. 20-21).  
Whilst it is possible to move back and forth between the horizontal and the vertical 
representations (Pasinetti, 1981), the two representations call attention to different features of the 
economy and highlight different opportunities and constraints for human action (Baranzini and 
Scazzieri, 1990, Cardinale, 2018b). The horizontal representation highlights division of labour 
between mutually dependent activities (activities needed for each other’s functioning), whereas the 
vertical representation highlights division of labour between sequentially related activities (activities 
needed along the same sequence of successive production stages).  
The two representations, while equivalent from the analytical point of view, highlight different 
constraints and opportunities. The horizontal representation calls attention to the constraints having 
to do with the need to coordinate activities simultaneously carried out in the same economy. A central 
example is the need to keep the system within proportions compatible with its viability, e.g. as 
specified by the Hawkins-Simon conditions (Hawkins and Simon, 1949). Opportunities have to do 
with the possibility for a given socio-economic group (e.g. an industry or a class defined on the basis 
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of the type of income) to receive a higher share of value added (Cardinale, 2018b). The vertical 
representation, in contrast, highlights the constraints due to the need to coordinate successive stages 
of the production process and the need for sufficient effective demand in the macroeconomy. It also 
reveals opportunities due to growth triggers specific to particular vertically integrated sectors, such 
as the interdependent and co-evolving processes activated by particular innovations, which Dahmén 
(1970 [1950], 1984, 1988) identifies as ‘development blocks’, or to the general state of the 
macroeconomy, as in the case of macroeconomic stimulus operated through demand of final goods. 
Moreover, each representation identifies different socio-economic aggregations as potential 
carriers of economic interests that face constraints and opportunities (Cardinale, 2018 a, b). In the 
horizontal approach, relevant aggregations can be industries or classes identified on the basis of type 
of income, depending on whether one assumes uniformity of wage and profit (Cardinale, 2018b, p. 
173-4). In the vertical approach, relevant aggregations can be vertically integrated sectors, classes, or 
the economy as a whole. The fact that aggregations that carry economic interests also depend on the 
representation of the economy adopted by actors reinforces the argument that we cannot take 
economic structures as univocally determining action. For example, depending on how a firm 
represents the system in which it operates, it might see itself as belonging to an industry or a vertically 
integrated sector, and visualise opportunities and constraints accordingly. In a similar fashion, 
workers in a given industry might see themselves as part of a uniform block of labour across industries 
and therefore opposed to capitalists across industries, or as part of their industry and therefore allied 
with the capitalists of the industry against the interests of other industries. Depending on such 
representations and the actions that are taken as a result, different paths of structural change may be 
activated out of those which are possible in a given situation. 
Therefore, in order to obtain a closer approximation of actual paths of structural change, we 
need to look at how actions take place within structures. As we discussed above, structures follow 
principles of proportionality that make certain motions feasible and others unfeasible by the principle 
of relative structural invariance. Hence, structures identify the range of feasible actions, but they do 
not determine which actions are made under the specific constraints and opportunities. Structures, 
however, may also play a more direct role in orienting actions (Cardinale, 2018 c, d). Here we must 
distinguish between the position that a given actor occupies in structures at a given moment and the 
positions occupied over time. A position occupied at a given moment is associated with constraints 
and opportunities. As we saw above, this depends on how actors represent the system (e.g. in a 
horizontal or vertical fashion) and their position therein. Such representation may in turn depend on 
the actor’s history of positioning. In fact, by occupying positions within structures over time, actors 
develop a propensity to visualise some opportunities and constraints as more salient than others, and 
24 
 
are therefore more oriented towards visualising those rather than others. As a result, even actors that 
occupy the same position at a given moment might represent the system differently, because their 
history of positioning may be different. 
This approach to the explanation of structural change presupposes a plural causality 
framework: existing structures determine feasible causal paths while individual or collective actions 
trigger some of those paths, but what paths are triggered in turn depends on positions within structures 
at a given moment and over time. This may also result in new structures being generated with the 
corresponding opportunities and constraints for further actions. However, even when such positions 
and their influence on actions are considered, the theory may explain the feasibility range for actions 
but cannot fully account for what actions actually take place, i.e. what possibilities turn into actual 
actions (Cardinale, 2018a, b, c, d). In other words, even considering the orienting effect of structures 
on action, structures cannot be seen as determining action.  
In fact, actors constantly need to use their existing categories, formed through previous action 
with structures, to interpret unfolding situations, which are never exactly the same as those already 
encountered. Therefore, agency is constantly involved in the categorization of unfolding experience 
and the selection of courses of action among those which are compatible with that categorization 




Theories of structural change study the relationship between changes in the magnitude of 
economic variables and changes in their composition. Such analysis relies on the criterion of relative 
structural invariance, whereby not all system components change at the same time or speed. This 
makes it possible to specify the range of variations afforded by given structures. However, in order 
to move from identifying a set of possibilities for change to describing a specific path out of those 
which are possible, theories of structural change rely on explicit or implicit assumptions about actions 
taking place within those structures. In our reading, this suggests that structural change is open-ended: 
economic structures in a given situation afford a variety of change paths, but it is the actions that 
actually take place within those structures that activate one path of change out of those which are 
possible. Therefore, theories of structural change should be interpreted as identifying possibilities for 
change, rather than specifying specific paths thereof. 
In order to understand structural change taking place in actual historical situations, we need 
to move to a different way of identifying which path of change will actually take place out of those 
which are made possible by structures: instead of making assumptions about actions, we need to 
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consider how actual actions take place within structures. We have shown that the same economic 
structures can be represented in different ways by the actors operating within them, so that structures 
cannot univocally determine actions. This provides a cogent argument for why structural change is 
inherently open-ended: structures can ex ante only specify possibilities but not the courses of action 
actually undertaken. However, we can explain why certain actions have been taken, and why certain 
consequences have arisen, after the multiple causal paths involved in the process under consideration 
have worked themselves out. Explaining structural change thus requires us to look at the interface 
between theory, which addresses the configuration and dynamics of structural constraints and 
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